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Abstract 
Based on the primary documentary sources of the 
Croatian State Archives (CSA), the Fonds of the For-
eign Ministry of the Independent State of Croatia 
(ISC) and the Croatian Information Bureau “Croa-
tia”, as well as information found in daily and peri-
odical newspapers printed from late 1944 to May 
1945, the author analyzes the content of the ISC press 
regarding foreign and domestic politics and war 
issues. Comparing political orders and dictations to 
newspaper editors with a large number of articles 
and the actual situation at the European battlefronts 
of that time, the author concludes that Ustasha prop-
aganda, supported by the Third Reich, significantly 
influenced the formation of public opinion in the ISC 
at the end of World War II. From the sources availa-
ble, it is now obvious that the majority of the ISC 
population was fully aware that the Third Reich, as 
well as its satellite states, had lost the war but the 
atmosphere which was deliberately created by the 
Ustasha authorities in the ISC caused a mass exodus 
in early May 1945 nevertheless. 
 
Sažetak 
Na temelju izvorne građe fondova Ministarstva 
vanjski poslova Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) i 
Hrvatskog dojavnog ureda „Croatia“ kao i novinske 
građe dnevnih i periodičnih izdanja s kraja 1944 i 
prvih pet mjeseci 1945., autor analizira sadržaj vanj-
skopolitičkih, unutrašnjopolitičkih i ratnih tema u 
tisku NDH. Povezujući naputke ustaških vlasti s 
većim brojem članaka u novinama i stvarnu situaciju 
na brojnim europski bojištima, autor zaključuje kako 
je ustaška promidžba, potpomognuta njemačkom 
imala značajan utjecaj na formiranje javnog mnijenja 
u NDH na kraju Drugog svjetskog rata. Iz autoru 
dostupne građe razvidno je da je većini građana 
NDH bilo jasno kako je Treći Reich, a onda i njeni 
sateliti, izgubio rat, no flagrantno stvarana atmosfera 
straha od komunističke odmazde doprinijela je ma-





In the period between the Battle of Stalingrad 
(1942-1943) and the fall of Berlin on 2 May 1945, 
which marked the end of World War II in Europe, 
the ISC press served the political and war goals of 
Germans and the Ustashas. A unified model of 
circulating information in the ISC was supported 
by a complex political control of the media, espe-
cially the newspapers, through the State Investi-
gative and Propaganda Bureau (Državni 
izvještajni i promičbeni ured – DIPU), the Head 
Office for Propaganda (Glavno ravnateljstvo za 
promičbu – GRP), the Press Department of the 
Foreign Ministry and the Home Supervisory Ser-
vice (Unutrašnja nadzorna služba – UNS). Follow-
ing the guidelines of the DIPU/GRP Press De-
partment, war and foreign policy topics were 
allotted as many as five pages per issue by the 
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most influential daily newspapers – Hrvatski narod 
(The Croatian People) Nova Hrvatska (The New 
Croatia), Hrvatski list (The Croatian Post) and Novi 
list from Sarajevo (The New Post); two or three 
pages were dedicated to these issues by the week-
lies Spremnost (The Willingness) and Novine (The 
Newspapers), as well as cartoons on the front 
pages of the humorous weeklies Vrabac (The Spar-
row) and Šilo (The Awl). 
War reports in the ISC newspapers used 
to contain only the information approved by the 
German press agency DNB, while news about the 
Allies were a selection of German, Italian, French, 
Bulgarian, Romanian and Finnish press releases. 
With the aim of increasing the credibility of 
newspapers, a selection of politically appropriate 
news was not infrequently made from the news-
papers of both neutral countries – such as Switzer-
land, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, or Portugal – and 
the enemy ones, such as the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Foreign con-
tent of the ISC press largely reflected the Ustasha 
views of the Allies, of the relation between the 
Allies and the People’s Liberation Movement 
(Narodnooslobodilački pokret – NOP), and of the 
consequences that agreements between the “Big 
Three” had on the ISC and the Axis forces. Edi-
tors-in-chief, newspaper directors and columnists 
for Spremnost, Hrvatski narod and Nova Hrvatska – 
Ivo Bogdan, Tijas Mortigi, Milivoj Magdić, Franjo 
Nevistić, Petar Bareza, Vilko Rieger, Ivo Vučičević 
and others – attempted to prove the necessity of 
the military and political alliance between the 
Ustashas and Germany. They also tried to present 
the Ustasha “revolution” as the struggle for a 
Croatian state, and the NOP as the Greater Serbia 
rebellion against it, allegedly led by communists 
with Soviet support. 
The alliance between the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States in the 
ISC press was defined as an unnatural collabora-
tion of plutocracy and communism. Its creation was 
said to have the sole purpose of enslaving the 
“smaller nations” and usurping each other’s colo-
nies. In the ISC press, issues surrounding Poland 
and Finland were presented as crucial evidence 
that proved the imperial politics of the Allies, 
supported by resolutions passed at the Allies’ 
conferences in Casablanca, Quebec, Moscow, Teh-
ran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and San Francisco. 
Bordering on the absurd, the Ustasha press often 
referred to the principles delineated in the Atlan-
tic Charter when criticizing the policies of the 
Allies. 
Unlike other newspapers in the ISC, 
Spremnost adopted a more benevolent view of 
Western democracies after the Tehran conference, 
which corresponded with the political shifts in the 
ISC. This was especially prominent in the editori-
als of Spremnost from summer and autumn issues 
of 1944 – when a part of Ustasha leadership was 
weighing the option of the ISC leaning towards 
the United Kingdom and the USA – and those 
from the spring of 1945, when the highest state 
officials planned go into exile and surrender to the 
Western Allies, as far from Tito’s Partisans as 
possible. The plans of the Ustasha leadership were 
revealed on 6 May 1945, the day German troops 
retreated from Zagreb, in articles printed by 
Spremnost, Hrvatski narod and Nova Hrvatska. 
Therein, similar to the Memorandum sent by the 
ISC government to the Western Allies, the ISC 
was included among the democratic states. 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of how the Ustasha Publishing 
House influenced the choice of content for Šilo, a hu-
morous weekly.  
 
The Independent State of Croatia press materi-
als on the 1945 European battlefronts 
 
A highly unfavorable military and strategic posi-
tion, in which Germany and its allies found them-
selves after the Allies had invaded Normandy and 
opened the Western Front, implied that war in 
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Europe might end in the course of 1944. It contin-
ued, however, into the first days of May 1945, 
with the bloody epilogue that took place in Berlin. 
Due to Germany’s fanatical determination, war in 
Europe was prolonged for six full months, alt-
hough it had long become obvious which was the 
winning side. Among other consequences, this 
would also extend the rule of the Ustasha gov-
ernment in the ISC. The English stance on the 
prolonged warfare in Europe was presented in a 
report of the Foreign Ministry of the ISC, dated 16 
August 1944, which might explain why the Usta-
sha regime decided to tie the fate of the ISC to that 
of the Third Reich: 
It is openly admitted in London that the hope-
less position of several thousand Germans in the field is 
the primary reason for the continuation of war. The 
personal mortal danger in which the leading troops 
have found itself is the main impediment for the vassal 
states to sign a special peace treaty, since there is no 
doubt that the Allies are prepared to sign a compromise 
peace with these countries./1/ 
German wartime propaganda, led by J. 
Goebbels, focused on the war against the Soviets. 
It is highly significant that it was exceedingly 
successful, despite the hopeless situation that 
Germany faced. German formula for prolonging 
the war coupled efficient concealment of the huge 
losses suffered in human and material resources 
/2/ with drafting the part of the male population 
which had up to then been a crucial part of the 
workforce. Of the 4.2 million German soldiers 
who had died prior to 1 January 1945, when the 
war was transferred to the German soil, 1.83 mil-
lion had died in combat against the Red Army. In 
the mere four months that were to follow, prior to 
9 May 1945 and the capitulation before the Soviet 
army, 1.4 million Germans more would die. These 
numbers testify to the success of German propa-
ganda and the persistence of German defense /3/. 
The first news that the preparations for 
the defense of Berlin had begun appeared in 
Novine and Novi list from Sarajevo. It was the 
midst of the great Soviet offensive on the Oder 
River in early February 1945, which was marked 
by the siege of the Silesian city Braslau 
(Wroclaw)/4/ and the Soviet attacks on Frankfurt 
(am-Oder) and Küstrin /5/. In the far north of the 
East Prussian front, main battles were still fought 
around Königsberg /6/, while the German front in 
Podunavlje fell apart. The last news from Buda-
pest was published by Novi list on 14 February 
1945 – The Budapest squad broke through, taking 
down three Soviet regiments – which confirmed that 
Germans had lost Budapest /7/ and that the Sovi-
ets could now march to Vienna unhindered. Us-
ing tested propaganda means, Germans cast the 
long and trying defense of Budapest in a positive 
light from a moral and strategic perspective: 
The Soviets did not accomplish their goal in 
Hungary, namely a forceful westward breach. They 
were also frustrated in their attempts to thwart the 
retreat of German armies stationed in Greece and on 
the Balkans. Regarding the heroic defense of Budapest, 
it has to be said that it denotes a victory of a kind – the 
moral victory of the National Socialist Hungarian 
worldview./8/ 
By early March 1945, in the western part 
of the German battlefront, the Allies had already 
reached the line of Lower Rhine, from Düsseldorf 
to Köln, where the fiercest battles were fought. 
Numerous German towns – Dresden, Magdeburg, 
Linz, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Ulm – suffered daily 
air-raids by the Allies /9/. Berlin was also heavily 
bombed, an issue which Hrvatski list covered in 
the following words: Superhuman efforts of the Ber-
lin people – From reports in the Daily Telegraph on the 
terrorist attacks on Berlin it is evident that people, not 
military aims, were targeted. The same article testi-
fied to the scale of the Allied air-raids in the fol-
lowing calculus, though it may not be fully accu-
rate: a ton of bombs to every 60 people is cast upon 
Berlin /10/. 
German cities on the Rhine fell, one after 
the other, on more or less daily basis – Köln /11/, 
Bonn,/12/ Mainz – but the newspaper coverage in 
the ISC was poor and indifferent. Even the first 
bridgehead over the western bank of the Rhine, 
which was established near Oppenheim by the 
Allies in late March 1945, was given close to no 
attention by Hrvatski list. /13/ The ISC newspapers 
reported on the events in the Western Front as if 
they did not concern the population of the ISC at 
all. Keeping their documentary stance, in news 
flashes and without any additional comments, the 
newspapers continued to report on the progress 
made by the western Allies in this manner 
throughout March and April of 1945. 
The news of the great Allied parachute 
landing on the Lower Rhine and their disem-
barkment between Bocholt and Wesel was report-
ed by the Zagreb weekly Novine on 26 March as 
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the beginning of an extensive struggle for the 
entire battlefront on the Rhine /14/. The fiercest 
offensive by the Allies, the ardor of which man-
aged to surpass even the first days of the invasion 
of Normandy, took place in the Lower Rhine, the 
operational domain of the US Ninth and the Brit-
ish Third Armies /15/, while the battle for Frank-
furt was fought in the Lower Main /16/. bIn early 
April, as Hrvatski narod reported, German forces 
had already managed to reach Kassel and Mün-
ster in the middle part of the Western Front in 
Germany /17/, Bremen and Hannover in the north 
/18/, and Nürnberg in the south /19/. The com-
plete breakdown of the German battlefront was 
reported in Hrvatski narod on 15 April, which con-
firmed that the Western Allies had managed to 
penetrate deep into the central part of the Reich, 
crossing the Elbe River near the city of Magde-
burg /20/. 
According to Hrvatski narod, during 
March there was limited combat on the Italian 
front – south of Imola and outside Bologna /21/. 
British forces would wait for early April to begin 
their decisive breakthrough in the Adriatic section 
of the battlefront, over Comacchio and towards 
the Po Valley /22/, and the subsequent attack on 
Bologna /23/. An extensive report on the execution 
by the firing squad of Mussolini was published in 
Novine on 30 April 1945: 
Italian communists execute Mussolini by 
shooting – Radio Milan reports that earlier today, just 
prior to the arrival of Anglo-American forces, a group 
of alleged Italian patriots captured Benito Mussolini, 
the president of the neo-fascist Social Republic, along 
with several of his closest associates, and had them 
brought before the so called Revolutionary Court. After 
a short pseudo-discussion, the Revolutionary Court, 
which consisted solely of communists, sentenced Benito 
Mussolini and his comrades to death by shooting. The 
execution was carried out immediately. The mutilated 
corpses of Benito Mussolini and his comrades were 
exposed at the Piazzale Loreto in Milan /24/. 
It was a message to the ISC citizens about 
what they could expect after the imminent victory 
of Tito’s communists. In this way, an atmosphere 
of fear and panic was being created, in the hope of 
prolonging the military resistance to the advanc-
ing forces of the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslavenska 
armija – JA). This would secure the retreat of the 
Ustasha authorities, army and a part of the people 
to the West. Naturally, the idea was neither feasi-
ble nor rational. From the viewpoint of the Usta-
sha leadership, the flight to the West was the only 
viable solution after the German defeat. 
The ISC newspapers reported that in early 
March 1945 the Soviets concentrated the main 
impact of their attacks in East Prussia, in the re-
gion between the Oder and Vistula rivers. The 
force of the Red Army attack targeted two Ger-
man camps, Stettin and Danzig, while the street 
fighting continued in the middle part of the East-
ern Front in Silesia, for the Silesian city of Braslau 
(Wroclaw). /25/ By late March, the Soviet forces in 
the south of the Eastern Front directed their at-
tacks towards Vienna, while advancing from 
Hungary over the Danube and Raba rivers /26/, 
and from Slovakia over the Hron /27/. In the mid-
dle part of Silesia, along the Neisse River, they 
struck towards Sudetenland /28/, whereas the 
strongest concentrated attack, according to Hrvat-
ski list, fell on Küstrin and Frankfurt-am-Oder, the 
last German strongholds before Berlin. In East 
Prussia, in the northern part of the battlefront, the 
same fate befell Gdynia and Danzig (Gdańsk). /29/ 
Hrvatski list reported that in the midst of 
the great Allied offensive in the West, which 
forced the Germans to retreat to the right bank of 
the Rhine, the German military leadership opted 
for a bitter defense in the East, considering the 
outcome in the Eastern Front crucial /30/. This 
was confirmed by the Führer’s visit in late March 
to the Oder battlefront, the closest one to the capi-
tal of the Third Reich, Berlin /31/, where the last 
German strongholds – Breslau, Glogau (Głogów), 
Kolberg, Stettin (Szczecin) and Divna – were un-
der severe attack by the Soviet forces /32/. 
On 27 March 1945, when no air-raids were 
expected over Berlin, Hitler traveled to the closest 
battlefield on the Oder. At the time, the German-
Soviet front extended along the Stettin–Küstrin–
Frankfurt–Guben line. Hitler's journey was men-
tioned in the ISC press with the same aim as in the 
Third Reich, namely to strengthen the soldiers' 
morale. 
In the crucial moments for the survival of 
the Third Reich, and the Ustasha regime connect-
ed with it, Hrvatski narod printed a statement by 
Minister Goebbels. 
I am certain that Führer will find a way out of 
these troubles. The decisive moment in the war will 
come at one second before twelve. The war cannot go on 
much further. We must overcome and we shall over-
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attention by Hrvatski list. /13/ The ISC newspapers 
reported on the events in the Western Front as if 
they did not concern the population of the ISC at 
all. Keeping their documentary stance, in news 
flashes and without any additional comments, the 
newspapers continued to report on the progress 
made by the western Allies in this manner 
throughout March and April of 1945. 
The news of the great Allied parachute 
landing on the Lower Rhine and their disem-
barkment between Bocholt and Wesel was report-
ed by the Zagreb weekly Novine on 26 March as 
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come the greatest difficulties /33/. The same newspa-
pers also printed an appeal to the soldiers on the 
Eastern Front by the Leader of the German Reich: 
Assault units, new battalions and civil troops are 
strengthening the German front in the East. The final 
Asian attack will be frustrated, just as the pressure of 
our adversaries in the West will be curbed at last. Our 
mortal enemy, the Jewish-Bolshevik and their masses 
have begun their assaults for the last time. They are 
trying to destroy Germany and exterminate our people. 
The greatest part of you, soldiers in the East, realize 
today what sort of destiny threatens our people, espe-
cially German women, girls and children. While the 
men and the elderly will be killed, women and girls will 
be downgraded as barrack sluts. The rest will go to 
Siberia.  /34/ 
Such propaganda was contrived by 
Goebbels, who supported Hitler in his attempt to 
keep resisting the Soviets until Germany and Ber-
lin were utterly destroyed. As the Commissioner 
for the defense of Berlin and the commanding 
officer of the Berlin Volkssturm (the “People’s 
Army”), he threatened citizens with severe retri-
bution if they did not join the defense of the city. 
People were also made to fortify the defense posts 
and Goebbels ordered to shoot down anyone who 
carried a white or red flag when the Red Army 
units marched into the city. 
In the final days of the war, Goebbels 
tried to convince Berliners that it was honorable to 
die in the defense of one’s city, so he ordered a 
film be made about the unsuccessful conquest by 
Napoleon of Kolberg in Pomerania, a town whose 
citizens fought valiantly against him. The film 
was never publicly shown, either to the citizens or 
the soldiers in Berlin, because the Red Army man-
aged to thwart Goebbels’s active propaganda. The 
defense of Berlin held until 2 May 1945, when 
General Helmuth Weidling, the commanding 
officer of the city’s defense, signed the capitula-
tion order to German troops in Berlin. Both Goeb-
bels and Hitler were dead by the time. /35/ 
At the German front, the second half of 
April was marked by the crucial Battle of Berlin, 
the capital of the Third Reich. According to in-
formation in Hrvatska gruda (The Croatian Soil), 
the forceful German resistance blocked the deci-
sive advancement of Western Allies across the 
Elbe River, with the exception of several bridge-
heads. The brunt of the defense of Berlin was, 
therefore, moved eastward. /36/ As late as 16 
April, Novine, a Zagreb weekly, tried to soothe its 
readership: 
The effects of warfare on two fronts, which has 
brought the events to the very gates of the Reich’s capi-
tal, are beginning to show. German defense now forms 
a double funnel in the narrowest place, where it needs 
to be strongest. According to the principles of the mod-
ern art of war, the main part of defense is located at 
that precise spot – the fortified Berlin. Battles are still 
far away, at the forefront of the fortified belt. /37/ 
However, as soon as 25 April, Hrvatski 
narod reported that the battle was raging just out-
side of Berlin, and that the Soviets were exerting 
strong pressure on the Havel River. /38/ Just two 
days later, they published the news of bitter fights 
in Pankow, the working class borough of Ber-
lin./39/ Unlike the reports on the combats along 
the Elbe, Novine now gave dramatic descriptions 
of how Germans defended Berlin against the Red 
Army: By day, fanatical strife rages in different build-
ings for central Berlin. The courageous crews have 
valiantly fought against the incessant attacks by the 
Bolshevik masses. Unfortunately, they have been una-
ble to stop the further penetration of the enemy into 
separate parts of the city. /40/ 
The Soviets advanced in all sections of the 
Eastern Front, and the ISC newspapers no longer 
tried to hide the fact. A war report from 30 April 
in Novine revealed the successful advance of the 
Red Army in the direction of Augsburg in Upper 
Swabia, west of Ostrava and Brno in Moravia, as 
well as in the north part of the Eastern Front, in 
the area of Mecklenburg–Pomerania and the di-
rection of Neubrandenburg and Templin. /41/ 
In such circumstances of utter military 
and political havoc, the news of Adolf Hitler’s 
death was published by the weekly Zagreb news-
paper Novine on 2 May 1945 in a rather stark and 
subdued tone. Several sentences described the 
leader of the Reich as the greatest European 
champion against Bolshevism, 
Adolf Hitler dead and succeeded by Grand 
Admiral Dönitz. German military headquarters have 
issued breaking news; today afternoon Adolf Hitler, 
Führer of the Great German Reich, fell in battle. In the 
written decree of 30 April he named the Grand Admi-
ral Dönitz his successor on the post of the Head of 
State and the Chancellor of the Reich, as well as the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Our Füh-
rer, Adolf Hitler, has fallen. German people bow down 
before him in deepest grief and respect. He recognized 
105
Alan Labus: PROPAGANDA IN THE PRESS AND THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION: POLITICAL AND WARTIME 
GOALS OF THE USTASHA GOVERNMENT AND THE THIRD REICH IN THE PRESS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROA-
TIA AT THE END OF WORLD WAR 2 
Informatol. 47, 2014., 2-3, 100-114 
ISSN 1330-0067                                                                                                                                                                         Coden: IORME7 
 
the deadly peril of Bolshevism early on and dedicated 
his life to opposing it. The end of his struggles, and of 
his impeccable life, is marked by the heroic death in the 
capital of the German Reich. His entire life was dedi-
cated to serving Germany. He has indebted not only 
Europe, but the entire cultured world by his contribu-
tion to the struggle against the Bolshevik invasion. /42/ 
The analysis of warfare at the European 
battlefronts in the weekly Novine ended with the 
conclusion that German forces were in a hopeless 
situation: The final part of the great and crucial battle 
is nearing its end. German armies are still tightly 
pressed between the Elbe and the Oder, as well as in 
Berlin itself, the focus of the Battle of Berlin, and in 
both the Czech–Moravia region and South Silesia. A 
portion of German forces is situated in the hilly regions 
of Upper and Lower Austria, and in the mountainous 
Bavaria. They are retreating from parts of Italy to-
wards the Tyrol and Carinthia borders, in the general 
direction of Slovenia, and holding up in the toughest 
battles, which have escalated in the heart of Berlin. 
Germans are still trying to hold their enemies back. 
They have been successful only around the Czech re-
gions and Moravia, in the eastern parts of mountain 
ranges located in the former Austria and its neighbor-
ing countries, as well as in the western part of Austri-
an battlefields where the Soviets have attacked. /43/ 
The last issue of Hrvatski narod was pub-
lished on 6 May, when its editorial coolly said of 
the international circumstances: 
It may be said that World War II has just end-
ed in Europe. Foundations have been laid for the crea-
tion of new international forces over a lengthy future 
period. There is some discussion in San Francisco 
about the world peace organization, while a new map of 
Europe will be made at the peace conference. Two 
short pieces followed, which were published on 
the front pages of both Hrvatski narod and Nova 
Hrvatska, and which confirmed the breakdown of 
the Third Reich: Cessation of resistance in North-
West Germany – The headquarters of the expeditionary 
Allied forces informed (on 5 May) that all resistance 
had ceased in North Germany. Montgomery reported 
to Eisenhower that all German forces in the Nether-
lands, North-West Germany and Denmark had sur-
rendered to the 21st Army Group. The battle for the 
capital of the Reich is over as well – in an unprecedent-
edly heroic battle, and true to their oath, various units 
along with civil troops resisted to their final breath – a 
symbol of the finest military demeanor. /44/ 
 
German war propaganda in the newspapers of 
the Independent State of Croatia 
 
In early March 1945, Hrvatski list, a weekly news-
paper from Osijek, printed the radio speech given 
by the Reich Minister J. Goebbels, 
We may conclude that all adversities and mis-
fortunes that have befallen the German people, alt-
hough exceedingly painful, do not necessarily mean we 
shall not emerge victorious, or that we shall suffer ruin 
and biological extinction. We have built new defense 
positions in the east, which are of temporary im-
portance both for the present cause and our future 
operations. Clearly, we shall have to win back the lost 
areas. However, the war has not ended nor will it be 
ended so. I am aware that there is a number of individ-
uals among us, and not the worst ones either, who 
would inquire of me how a new prospect for victory 
could ever be discerned from the troubled position we 
currently hold. Let me not hesitate in uttering sober 
statements. We have suffered great losses in food and 
weapon supplies. Nevertheless, it does not mean the 
losses are of such magnitude that we are able to con-
tinue the war in a limited scope only. /45/ 
In lieu with Goebbels’s unfounded opti-
mism, the readers were continually persuaded 
that Germany had hidden reserves and potentials 
to turn the tide of war to their own favor. German 
weapons are becoming deadlier by the day – Its produc-
tion has not peaked yet. /46/ 
 
Figure 2: An example of a text glorifying new German 
missile weapons, which the Investigative Bureau of the 
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come the greatest difficulties /33/. The same newspa-
pers also printed an appeal to the soldiers on the 
Eastern Front by the Leader of the German Reich: 
Assault units, new battalions and civil troops are 
strengthening the German front in the East. The final 
Asian attack will be frustrated, just as the pressure of 
our adversaries in the West will be curbed at last. Our 
mortal enemy, the Jewish-Bolshevik and their masses 
have begun their assaults for the last time. They are 
trying to destroy Germany and exterminate our people. 
The greatest part of you, soldiers in the East, realize 
today what sort of destiny threatens our people, espe-
cially German women, girls and children. While the 
men and the elderly will be killed, women and girls will 
be downgraded as barrack sluts. The rest will go to 
Siberia.  /34/ 
Such propaganda was contrived by 
Goebbels, who supported Hitler in his attempt to 
keep resisting the Soviets until Germany and Ber-
lin were utterly destroyed. As the Commissioner 
for the defense of Berlin and the commanding 
officer of the Berlin Volkssturm (the “People’s 
Army”), he threatened citizens with severe retri-
bution if they did not join the defense of the city. 
People were also made to fortify the defense posts 
and Goebbels ordered to shoot down anyone who 
carried a white or red flag when the Red Army 
units marched into the city. 
In the final days of the war, Goebbels 
tried to convince Berliners that it was honorable to 
die in the defense of one’s city, so he ordered a 
film be made about the unsuccessful conquest by 
Napoleon of Kolberg in Pomerania, a town whose 
citizens fought valiantly against him. The film 
was never publicly shown, either to the citizens or 
the soldiers in Berlin, because the Red Army man-
aged to thwart Goebbels’s active propaganda. The 
defense of Berlin held until 2 May 1945, when 
General Helmuth Weidling, the commanding 
officer of the city’s defense, signed the capitula-
tion order to German troops in Berlin. Both Goeb-
bels and Hitler were dead by the time. /35/ 
At the German front, the second half of 
April was marked by the crucial Battle of Berlin, 
the capital of the Third Reich. According to in-
formation in Hrvatska gruda (The Croatian Soil), 
the forceful German resistance blocked the deci-
sive advancement of Western Allies across the 
Elbe River, with the exception of several bridge-
heads. The brunt of the defense of Berlin was, 
therefore, moved eastward. /36/ As late as 16 
April, Novine, a Zagreb weekly, tried to soothe its 
readership: 
The effects of warfare on two fronts, which has 
brought the events to the very gates of the Reich’s capi-
tal, are beginning to show. German defense now forms 
a double funnel in the narrowest place, where it needs 
to be strongest. According to the principles of the mod-
ern art of war, the main part of defense is located at 
that precise spot – the fortified Berlin. Battles are still 
far away, at the forefront of the fortified belt. /37/ 
However, as soon as 25 April, Hrvatski 
narod reported that the battle was raging just out-
side of Berlin, and that the Soviets were exerting 
strong pressure on the Havel River. /38/ Just two 
days later, they published the news of bitter fights 
in Pankow, the working class borough of Ber-
lin./39/ Unlike the reports on the combats along 
the Elbe, Novine now gave dramatic descriptions 
of how Germans defended Berlin against the Red 
Army: By day, fanatical strife rages in different build-
ings for central Berlin. The courageous crews have 
valiantly fought against the incessant attacks by the 
Bolshevik masses. Unfortunately, they have been una-
ble to stop the further penetration of the enemy into 
separate parts of the city. /40/ 
The Soviets advanced in all sections of the 
Eastern Front, and the ISC newspapers no longer 
tried to hide the fact. A war report from 30 April 
in Novine revealed the successful advance of the 
Red Army in the direction of Augsburg in Upper 
Swabia, west of Ostrava and Brno in Moravia, as 
well as in the north part of the Eastern Front, in 
the area of Mecklenburg–Pomerania and the di-
rection of Neubrandenburg and Templin. /41/ 
In such circumstances of utter military 
and political havoc, the news of Adolf Hitler’s 
death was published by the weekly Zagreb news-
paper Novine on 2 May 1945 in a rather stark and 
subdued tone. Several sentences described the 
leader of the Reich as the greatest European 
champion against Bolshevism, 
Adolf Hitler dead and succeeded by Grand 
Admiral Dönitz. German military headquarters have 
issued breaking news; today afternoon Adolf Hitler, 
Führer of the Great German Reich, fell in battle. In the 
written decree of 30 April he named the Grand Admi-
ral Dönitz his successor on the post of the Head of 
State and the Chancellor of the Reich, as well as the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Our Füh-
rer, Adolf Hitler, has fallen. German people bow down 
before him in deepest grief and respect. He recognized 
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ISC’s Foreign Ministry chose from the neutral Swiss 
newspapers Volksrecht to be published in the ISC 
newspapers. 
 
According to information in Novi list from 
Sarajevo, Germans prepared to develop new long 
range V-weapons, since launch ramps were being 
moved further away from the main aim, London. 
/47/ There was an increased propaganda regard-
ing the force and range of German missile weap-
ons – V-bombs on New York /48/ – with the aim of 
strengthening the combat spirit among Germans 
and their allies, but which also served to increase 
fear among their enemies. For added credibility, 
public addresses of the enemy side were often 
used. Such was the case on 4 April when Hrvatski 
list, on the basis of news reports from Lisbon, 
published an article titled Eisenhower on the 
strength of German resistance, which said, I do not 
want you to think that I consider this war to be over. 
Nobody knows what Germans are capable of within 
their borders /49/. This thesis needed support, so in 
order to be more convincing information was 
circulated that in the occupied eastern and west-
ern parts of the Reich there existed a movement of 
“German freedom fighters”, 
On Easter Sunday, for the first time ever, the 
call sign of a new radio transmitter, called the “Were-
wolf” (Werwolf), was released in ether. It operates in 
public as a limb of the National Socialist movement led 
by freedom fighters, and has originated in the occupied 
western and eastern regions of the Reich. The move-
ment’s headquarters addressed German people through 
the radio, emphatically proclaiming the will of German 
men and women, both young and old, to continue 
fighting for freedom and honor in the occupied territo-
ry, behind the enemy’s back, and to pay them back in 
blood for atrocities against the German people. /50/ 
Croatian public was being persuaded that the 
Allies are nowhere close to winning the war, and 
that there was a valid chance that the tide of war 
would turn in favor of the Germans. This expecta-
tion was, however, highly unreasonable, and the 
Werwolf organization was an utter fiction. 
The Werwolf project was designed in the 
SS headquarters, under the direction of H. Himm-
ler, and was led by Hans Pruetzmann. The idea of 
guerilla resistance in the German area was born in 
late 1944, at the time of German retreat from both 
Western and Eastern Europe. The underground 
Nazi group – which stood by Hitler’s declaration 
of We shall never capitulate – was supposed to 
begin its work after the defeat of Germany, or at 
least such messages were dispatched through 
Radio-Werwolf from 1 April 1945 onward. This did 
not occur, however, since the name of Werwolf 
had no substance to it. The existence of Radio-
Werwolf was independent from the headquarters 
of H. Pruetzmann, who, we might add, never 
believed the project would be realized, and so 
criticized it often in Himmler’s presence. The lack 
of serious commitment by the Nazi leadership is 
obvious from the fact that Pruetzmann himself, 
who was supposed to organize the post-war guer-
rilla, attempted twice to personally enter negotia-
tions with the Allies, in the hope of securing the 
optimal conditions of surrender. Although J. 
Goebbels used Radio-Werwolf for propaganda 
since its inception, this not only had little to do 
with the actual goals of the phantom Werwolf or-
ganization, but stood in stark contrast to them. In 
the declaration of German capitulation on 9 May 
1945, Grand Admiral Dönitz invited all Werwolfs 
in West Germany to cease their resistance. They 
obeyed his order. The fact that Germany was the 
only European country occupied during World 
War II which did not have organized resistance, is 
a paradox of a sort. It closely mirrored Hitler’s 
own attitude of “world domination or destruc-
tion”, which was additionally supported by J. 
Goebbels’s propaganda. /51/ 
A special point of interest covered by 
German propaganda was the economy of states 
which the Western Allies controlled. To this end, 
information was often collected from the news of 
neutral or enemy countries. The foreign press 
overviews issued by the Information Bureau of 
the Foreign Ministry insisted on conveying arti-
cles that covered social topics. They wanted to 
prove how pointless the Allies’ war was, and 
what damage the allegedly freed countries had to 
suffer. In late 1944, therefore, special attention 
was given to the difficult economic situation in 
areas south of Rome, which were directly affected 
by the war and where over 200 thousand people 
were exposed to starvation and hunger. Poverty is 
such, the Foreign Ministry’s “Overview” said 
based on information gathered from the Swiss, 
that the bodies of the dead are undressed before the 
burial, and their clothes given to those in need. The 
United States and the Great Britain do not care for the 
economic situation and slowly leave Italy to Soviet 
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influence, which is confirmed by the growing political 
power of the Communist Party on the Apennine Pen-
insula. /52/ 
Similar problems arising in the war-
ravaged countries were covered by nearly all 
newspapers, following dictations of the regime in 
power. Thus in early 1945 the Sarajevo Novi list 
brings alarming news from Western Europe. 
Appalling conditions in Italy, France and Bel-
gium – The majority of Italian people do not have regu-
lar jobs. Workers earn 50-100 lira per day... However, 
the simplest meal in a third-class inn costs 200... The 
result of such situation is poverty. /53/ In this con-
text, on 21 February Novi list put a rhetorical ques-
tion before its readers: What would become of us, 
and what would become of Europe, if we capitulated? 
Even if we lacked everything else, do you think we 
would have enough to eat? Can the United States of 
America help the hungry peoples of Europe? It then 
used an article from a North-American newspa-
per, The Saturday Evening Post, to answer its own 
question: Millions must starve.  /54/ 
 
 
Figure 3: One of the many captions in Hrvatski list 
devoted to the difficult economic situation in countries 
controlled by the Allies. 
 
The importance of allegedly significant 
German strongholds in the far west of France was 
over-exaggerated for propaganda purposes as 
well. Based on the writings in the Swiss weekly 
L’illustrate, an article titled The Forgotten Front 
from Hrvatski narod reminded that Germans still 
had many strongholds in the Atlantic – along with 
Saint-Nazaire, a quarter of the department in the 
Lower Loire, including La Baule, Guerande, Le 
Croisic, La Roche-Bernard, Pontchateau, Savenay, 
Paimboeuf, Saint-Previn etc. This meant Germans 
controlled about 115 thousand people north of the 
Loire and 25 thousand south of the river, in the 
350 km² area /55/, yet the style of writing suggest-
ed it could, somehow, be a turning point in the 
war. 
In early April 1945, Hrvatski narod pub-
lished an article titled Latest rise in defensive power 
of German divisions, which said Germany still con-
trolled the main strongholds of the European bat-
tlefront that included the Upper Rhine, French 
Alps, North Italy, Croatia, Vienna, West Hungary, 
Courland and Norway. /56/ The style was not 
meant to keep up the fighting spirit or the read-
ers’ belief in the final victory, for it was clear by 
then that Germany had lost the war, and with it 
the ISC as well. The irrational propaganda was 
the result of the decision made by the political 
establishment of the ISC to share in the destiny of 
their German allies. The decision was neither an 
act of heroism, nor can it be characterized as the 
moral persistence of the leading Ustasha regime. 
It was brought about by German duress, or the 
overall military and political circumstances preva-
lent in Europe at the end of the war. 
 
Ustasha propaganda against the NOP and lean-
ing towards the Western Allies on the pages of 
Hrvatski narod and Spremnost 
 
In late 1944, when it became clear that Germany 
was defeated, editorials of the most circulated 
daily in the ISC, Hrvatski narod, ceased to advocate 
German victory. Instead, they attempted to prove 
by vague wording how pointless the Allied suc-
cess was when compared to the unbreakable and 
unbowed spirit of the “fighting nations of Eu-
rope”. 
In the editorial titled Who shall win, from 
early December 1944, Milan Ilinić /57/ claimed 
that the era of the Versailles Europe had ended 
forever and that, regardless of the outcome of the 
war, the nations of Europe would not accept 
peace conditions that were against the people’s 
will and national interests. Justifying the war, or, 
more precisely, the European national movements 
in the struggle against the Versailles order, Ilinić 
recalled the slogan We shan’t yield our own, nor ask 
for another’s, in the context of alleged Croatian 
interest. Ilinić downplayed the outcome of the 
war regardless of who won, for, according to him, 
victory meant nothing if the spirit of the defeated 
was “unbreakable”: 
It has already been proven that nations, and 
especially big ones, can not be eradicated. If they are led 
by politicians who will not capitulate, their future is 
guaranteed. The enemy can not be defeated in war if his 
every house is a fortress, and every bush and tree a 
cover for a rifle or a machine-gun /58/. The message 
to the readers was clear – the war may have been 
lost, but there was no need to give up the holy 
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ISC’s Foreign Ministry chose from the neutral Swiss 
newspapers Volksrecht to be published in the ISC 
newspapers. 
 
According to information in Novi list from 
Sarajevo, Germans prepared to develop new long 
range V-weapons, since launch ramps were being 
moved further away from the main aim, London. 
/47/ There was an increased propaganda regard-
ing the force and range of German missile weap-
ons – V-bombs on New York /48/ – with the aim of 
strengthening the combat spirit among Germans 
and their allies, but which also served to increase 
fear among their enemies. For added credibility, 
public addresses of the enemy side were often 
used. Such was the case on 4 April when Hrvatski 
list, on the basis of news reports from Lisbon, 
published an article titled Eisenhower on the 
strength of German resistance, which said, I do not 
want you to think that I consider this war to be over. 
Nobody knows what Germans are capable of within 
their borders /49/. This thesis needed support, so in 
order to be more convincing information was 
circulated that in the occupied eastern and west-
ern parts of the Reich there existed a movement of 
“German freedom fighters”, 
On Easter Sunday, for the first time ever, the 
call sign of a new radio transmitter, called the “Were-
wolf” (Werwolf), was released in ether. It operates in 
public as a limb of the National Socialist movement led 
by freedom fighters, and has originated in the occupied 
western and eastern regions of the Reich. The move-
ment’s headquarters addressed German people through 
the radio, emphatically proclaiming the will of German 
men and women, both young and old, to continue 
fighting for freedom and honor in the occupied territo-
ry, behind the enemy’s back, and to pay them back in 
blood for atrocities against the German people. /50/ 
Croatian public was being persuaded that the 
Allies are nowhere close to winning the war, and 
that there was a valid chance that the tide of war 
would turn in favor of the Germans. This expecta-
tion was, however, highly unreasonable, and the 
Werwolf organization was an utter fiction. 
The Werwolf project was designed in the 
SS headquarters, under the direction of H. Himm-
ler, and was led by Hans Pruetzmann. The idea of 
guerilla resistance in the German area was born in 
late 1944, at the time of German retreat from both 
Western and Eastern Europe. The underground 
Nazi group – which stood by Hitler’s declaration 
of We shall never capitulate – was supposed to 
begin its work after the defeat of Germany, or at 
least such messages were dispatched through 
Radio-Werwolf from 1 April 1945 onward. This did 
not occur, however, since the name of Werwolf 
had no substance to it. The existence of Radio-
Werwolf was independent from the headquarters 
of H. Pruetzmann, who, we might add, never 
believed the project would be realized, and so 
criticized it often in Himmler’s presence. The lack 
of serious commitment by the Nazi leadership is 
obvious from the fact that Pruetzmann himself, 
who was supposed to organize the post-war guer-
rilla, attempted twice to personally enter negotia-
tions with the Allies, in the hope of securing the 
optimal conditions of surrender. Although J. 
Goebbels used Radio-Werwolf for propaganda 
since its inception, this not only had little to do 
with the actual goals of the phantom Werwolf or-
ganization, but stood in stark contrast to them. In 
the declaration of German capitulation on 9 May 
1945, Grand Admiral Dönitz invited all Werwolfs 
in West Germany to cease their resistance. They 
obeyed his order. The fact that Germany was the 
only European country occupied during World 
War II which did not have organized resistance, is 
a paradox of a sort. It closely mirrored Hitler’s 
own attitude of “world domination or destruc-
tion”, which was additionally supported by J. 
Goebbels’s propaganda. /51/ 
A special point of interest covered by 
German propaganda was the economy of states 
which the Western Allies controlled. To this end, 
information was often collected from the news of 
neutral or enemy countries. The foreign press 
overviews issued by the Information Bureau of 
the Foreign Ministry insisted on conveying arti-
cles that covered social topics. They wanted to 
prove how pointless the Allies’ war was, and 
what damage the allegedly freed countries had to 
suffer. In late 1944, therefore, special attention 
was given to the difficult economic situation in 
areas south of Rome, which were directly affected 
by the war and where over 200 thousand people 
were exposed to starvation and hunger. Poverty is 
such, the Foreign Ministry’s “Overview” said 
based on information gathered from the Swiss, 
that the bodies of the dead are undressed before the 
burial, and their clothes given to those in need. The 
United States and the Great Britain do not care for the 
economic situation and slowly leave Italy to Soviet 
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purpose, the Croatian state. On such a thorny 
path, the author implied, one should follow wise 
politicians, or the Ustasha leadership headed by 
Pavelić. 
Marko Čović also wrote about the “wise 
people”, reminding his readers of the sacred duty 
that each Croat had towards homeland in the 
uncertain war circumstances: Wise people live and 
apply their wisdom with the help of guns, at work and 
in combat. The author went on to say that the situ-
ation of the ISC in late 1944 was simple to under-
stand. Enemy armies were on the country’s bor-
ders, and there was no alternative to being brave 
and following those who knew what to do and 
how to act on 10 April, the first “birthday” of the 
Croatian state. /59/ 
The fear that the Ustasha regime had of 
Tito’s communists, or Stalin’s agency as they 
called the newly formed Yugoslav leadership in 
Belgrade, would best be described by the content 
of editorials in Spremnost during January, Febru-
ary and March of 1945. Columnists such as Mili-
voj Magdić /60/, Franjo Nevistić /61/, Stanko 
Vitković /62/, Vilko Rieger /63/ and Petar Bareza 
/64/ were given the assignment to explain what 
awaited Croatia after the Allies’ victory, or the 
arrival of the People's Liberation Army of Yugo-
slavia (Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije – 
NOVJ). There was a fictitious belief, however, 
which arose as a phenomenon of the Hitler’s mili-
tary and political strategy at the end of the war, 
that the Ustasha Croatia might be acceptable to 
the Western Allies. In this project concocted by 
the Ustashas, they would politically remain faith-
ful to their German allies in the struggle against 
Bolshevism, while seeking common ground for 
negotiations with the Western Allies. To make the 
paradox even greater, Poglavnik himself made the 
attempt of joining the Western Allies impossible 
in September 1944, when he decided to side with 
his German ally. 
A more benevolent instance of criticizing 
Western Allies appeared in an article by Franjo 
Nevistić, Our way, published on 21 January 1945. 
In it he described England as the best of democra-
cies, comparing it to the Roman Republic and the 
Greek poleis, though resenting the imposition of 
democratic principles outside its own borders. 
Nevistić put the question of whether or not the 
right to self-determination was a fundamental 
democratic one, and if it was, why it was disputed 
when the Ustasha authorities exercised it in 1941. 
In other words, he wondered why the English 
would not lend a hand to the Croatian struggle 
for their own state against communism as the 
common enemy. /65/ 
Employing the same reasoning, Milivoj 
Magdić wrote his article from 4 February 1945 
titled Facing a decision? – Relations within the Anglo-
Saxon–Soviet military coalition have entered a phase in 
which they can no longer delay the resolution of politi-
cal issues. In it he spoke of the English as of the last 
barrier to Bolshevism in the Balkans. He based his 
rationale on one of Churchill’s speeches in which 
he had condemned Greek partisans, and left out 
NOVJ when enumerating anti-fascist movements 
in Europe. Churchill’s attitudes were interpreted 
by Magdić as an attempt to oppose the Bolshevik 
goals in Southeastern Europe. Magdić considered 
Tito and the National Committee for the Libera-
tion of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni komitet oslo-
bođenja Jugoslavije – NKOJ) in Belgrade the long 
arm of Moscow in the former Yugoslavia, an anti-
democratic element which refused to cooperate 
with other parties in the formation of government.  
/66/ Magdić believed that the English and the 
Americans would not idly observe the realization 
of Soviet plans, and he explained their attitudes 
stood in direct opposition: It is wrong to presume, 
he concluded, that their coalition represents a firm 
alliance with an already formed opinion on how post-
war issues will be settled. /67/ 
The differences between the Western Al-
lies and the Soviets would grow as the war drew 
to its close. They were a prelude to the division of 
Europe and the world in the times of the Cold 
War. Ustasha propaganda, however, disregarded 
the fact that the alliance between the Western 
Allies and the Soviets was formed to wage war 
against Germany and its allies until the final vic-
tory. Nothing could jeopardize this goal; it was 
firmly set both in late 1941, when the USA entered 
the war, and especially after Tehran, when the 
alliance was consolidated, and military and politi-
cal goals set. The liberation march of the Red Ar-
my in Southeastern Europe – in Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Yugoslavia – met with approval of the 
Western Allies. It was welcomed as a significant 
success and a part of the joint military strategy of 
the allied armies. /68/ Since the areas of influence 
were settled in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
at the same time, it was logical that both sides 
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would promote their own political goals. The 
Soviets supported Tito and the communists 
(which was confirmed by an agreement that 
granted the Red Army units temporary entrance 
into Yugoslav territory, along with NKOJ, in Oc-
tober 1944), while the British supported the gov-
ernment-in-exile led by N. Šubašić, hoping to 
thwart the formation of communist Yugoslavia. 
/69/ British fear of communist dominance in 
Southeastern Europe was compensated by a mili-
tary intervention in Greece, where they interfered 
with the take-over by EAM./70/ However, the 
British did not intend to undertake a similar ven-
ture in Yugoslavia, as Churchill unambiguously 
told King Peter II in early 1945, warning him of 
the necessity to accept the Tito–Šubašić agreement 
and the formation of the provisional government 
/71/. Ustasha hopes of an intervention by the 
Western Allies on Yugoslav territory, once the 




Figure 4: In early February 1944, Novine published 
on its front page bombastic news of another pending 
world war, which was in accordance with the propa-
ganda guidelines by the Ustasha authorities at the end 
of World War II. 
In another place, Petar Bareza tried to 
prove in his article The Yugoslav issue that resolu-
tions passed by the Big Three in Crimea actually 
supported the interests of the Greater Serbia and 
the formation of another Yugoslav unity in which 
Serbia would hold supremacy. By subscribing to 
the false Serbian struggle against occupation, 
Bareza said, London and Moscow were impelled 
to prolong the fiction called Yugoslavia. They 
were not interested in Yugoslavia itself, but the 
destruction of the Croatian state and the creation 
of a new Yugoslav unity under Serbian suprema-
cy. /72/ 
In his article Enemy basis – The artificial cre-
ation known as Yugoslavia cannot be established 
against the will of the entire Croatian people, Vilko 
Rieger reviewed the Crimea conclusions in the 
same light, as a new concession by the British 
politics to Serbia. The decision to form the Provi-
sional government of the Democratic Federation 
of Yugoslavia (Demokratska federacija Jugoslavije 
– DFJ), which was created by the agreement be-
tween Tito and Šubašić, was supported in Yalta 
by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, Rieger said. 
The same was true of including in the Anti-Fascist 
Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia 
(Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugo-
slavije – AVNOJ), a temporary legislative body, 
those members of the final Yugoslav parliament 
who were not compromised by cooperating with 
the enemy. Rieger had no doubts as to why the 
Anglo-Americans and the Soviets agreed to form 
the provisional legislature of Yugoslavia on com-
pletely undemocratic terms. Their goal was to 
ensure Serbian dominance in the restored parlia-
ment in Belgrade, or the new Yugoslavia. He con-
cluded that reasons for King Peter’s sudden coop-
eration regarding the formation of Regency and 
the common government were clear, just as was 
Šubašić’s urgent trip to Belgrade in mid-February 
1945. Nevertheless, Rieger warned, it was not 
certain King Peter II would manage to restore the 
monarchy because Tito firmly decided to retain 
power. For Rieger, the King was the exponent of 
English policy in former Yugoslavia, and Tito of 
the Soviet one; in other words, both Tito and the 
King were pawns in the hands of the Allies. Alt-
hough he claimed the realization of a new Yugo-
slavia would be fatal for Croats, he offered no 
alternative, except the usual, unrealistic slogans 
about the necessity of a persistent struggle for the 
conservation of the Croatian state. /73/ 
It is absurd that Ustasha propaganda in 
the pages of Spremnost referred to democratic 
principles, the Atlantic Charter and the resolu-
tions from Dumbarton Oaks, while criticizing 
communist intentions of a single-party leadership 
in the new Yugoslavia, when the very same Usta-
sha authorities abolished Croatian parliamentary 
structure. /74/ 
The ISC press sent a straightforward mes-
sage to the citizens of Croatia on what they could 
expect after the communist government was 
formed, and what the destiny of the Croatian state 
would be when the political program from Yalta 
was realized. All newspapers had to cast Ustashas 
as patriots fighting for their own state, and the 
Ustasha struggle as defensive and anti-Bolshevik 
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purpose, the Croatian state. On such a thorny 
path, the author implied, one should follow wise 
politicians, or the Ustasha leadership headed by 
Pavelić. 
Marko Čović also wrote about the “wise 
people”, reminding his readers of the sacred duty 
that each Croat had towards homeland in the 
uncertain war circumstances: Wise people live and 
apply their wisdom with the help of guns, at work and 
in combat. The author went on to say that the situ-
ation of the ISC in late 1944 was simple to under-
stand. Enemy armies were on the country’s bor-
ders, and there was no alternative to being brave 
and following those who knew what to do and 
how to act on 10 April, the first “birthday” of the 
Croatian state. /59/ 
The fear that the Ustasha regime had of 
Tito’s communists, or Stalin’s agency as they 
called the newly formed Yugoslav leadership in 
Belgrade, would best be described by the content 
of editorials in Spremnost during January, Febru-
ary and March of 1945. Columnists such as Mili-
voj Magdić /60/, Franjo Nevistić /61/, Stanko 
Vitković /62/, Vilko Rieger /63/ and Petar Bareza 
/64/ were given the assignment to explain what 
awaited Croatia after the Allies’ victory, or the 
arrival of the People's Liberation Army of Yugo-
slavia (Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije – 
NOVJ). There was a fictitious belief, however, 
which arose as a phenomenon of the Hitler’s mili-
tary and political strategy at the end of the war, 
that the Ustasha Croatia might be acceptable to 
the Western Allies. In this project concocted by 
the Ustashas, they would politically remain faith-
ful to their German allies in the struggle against 
Bolshevism, while seeking common ground for 
negotiations with the Western Allies. To make the 
paradox even greater, Poglavnik himself made the 
attempt of joining the Western Allies impossible 
in September 1944, when he decided to side with 
his German ally. 
A more benevolent instance of criticizing 
Western Allies appeared in an article by Franjo 
Nevistić, Our way, published on 21 January 1945. 
In it he described England as the best of democra-
cies, comparing it to the Roman Republic and the 
Greek poleis, though resenting the imposition of 
democratic principles outside its own borders. 
Nevistić put the question of whether or not the 
right to self-determination was a fundamental 
democratic one, and if it was, why it was disputed 
when the Ustasha authorities exercised it in 1941. 
In other words, he wondered why the English 
would not lend a hand to the Croatian struggle 
for their own state against communism as the 
common enemy. /65/ 
Employing the same reasoning, Milivoj 
Magdić wrote his article from 4 February 1945 
titled Facing a decision? – Relations within the Anglo-
Saxon–Soviet military coalition have entered a phase in 
which they can no longer delay the resolution of politi-
cal issues. In it he spoke of the English as of the last 
barrier to Bolshevism in the Balkans. He based his 
rationale on one of Churchill’s speeches in which 
he had condemned Greek partisans, and left out 
NOVJ when enumerating anti-fascist movements 
in Europe. Churchill’s attitudes were interpreted 
by Magdić as an attempt to oppose the Bolshevik 
goals in Southeastern Europe. Magdić considered 
Tito and the National Committee for the Libera-
tion of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni komitet oslo-
bođenja Jugoslavije – NKOJ) in Belgrade the long 
arm of Moscow in the former Yugoslavia, an anti-
democratic element which refused to cooperate 
with other parties in the formation of government.  
/66/ Magdić believed that the English and the 
Americans would not idly observe the realization 
of Soviet plans, and he explained their attitudes 
stood in direct opposition: It is wrong to presume, 
he concluded, that their coalition represents a firm 
alliance with an already formed opinion on how post-
war issues will be settled. /67/ 
The differences between the Western Al-
lies and the Soviets would grow as the war drew 
to its close. They were a prelude to the division of 
Europe and the world in the times of the Cold 
War. Ustasha propaganda, however, disregarded 
the fact that the alliance between the Western 
Allies and the Soviets was formed to wage war 
against Germany and its allies until the final vic-
tory. Nothing could jeopardize this goal; it was 
firmly set both in late 1941, when the USA entered 
the war, and especially after Tehran, when the 
alliance was consolidated, and military and politi-
cal goals set. The liberation march of the Red Ar-
my in Southeastern Europe – in Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Yugoslavia – met with approval of the 
Western Allies. It was welcomed as a significant 
success and a part of the joint military strategy of 
the allied armies. /68/ Since the areas of influence 
were settled in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
at the same time, it was logical that both sides 
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in nature, the evidence of which is found in the 
aforementioned editorials by Milan Ilinić and 
Marko Čović in Hrvatski narod. In the final months 
of the war, Hrvatski narod, as the most widely cir-
culated daily in the ISC, and Spremnost, as the 
most important weekly newspaper, had the task 
of building up a fighting spirit of a kind, as well 
as creating the atmosphere of fear from com-
munist retribution, to which testify articles by 
Milan Ilinić, Ivan Oršanić and Marko Čović, but 
also those of Milivoj Magdić, Petar Bareza, Tijas 
Mortigi, Vilko Rieger and others. /75/ 
The first goal of Ustasha leadership was 
not reached, since global war circumstances dic-
tated the fate of Ustasha regime and the ISC, 
while the anti-communist propaganda was partly 
successful, the testimony to which are some 115-
120 thousand members of the Croatian armed 
forces and civilians who fled to the West in early 
May 1945. /76/ 
Spremnost had another task, namely to se-
cure the surrender of Ustasha leadership in the 
West. There is no other viable explanation for its 
moderately Anglophile character in times when 
newspaper editorial staff was “Ustasha-ized”, 
which meant that journalists who declined to join 
the Ustasha ranks were fired, persecuted and 
incarcerated. 
To fulfill its mission as the war drew to its 
end, Ustasha propaganda had to simulate the 
change in values which supported Ustasha ideol-
ogy. On the pages of Spremnost, plutocrats were no 
longer the bitterest of enemies, since by the end of 
the war the ISC government secretly tried to find 
common ground with the Western Allies, at least 
as far as it concerned the terms of surrender, 
which necessarily affected the choice of language 
in the newspapers. The Ustasha regime consid-
ered Soviets a more dangerous enemy than West-
ern democracies, and therefore opted for the less-
er of the “two evils”. When this is viewed in the 
light of the Memorandum sent on 4 May 1945 to 
General Harold Alexander, the commanding of-
ficer of the Allied forces on the Mediterranean, the 
intention of the Ustasha leadership was clear. /77/ 
 
Conclusion 
In late 1944 and early 1945, the ISC newspapers 
tried to prove the existence of discord between the 
Allies, and the absurdity of shared war goals be-
tween the USA, the United Kingdom and the 
USSR. It was an important task for the Ustasha 
regime. In February, March and April of 1945, 
daily newspapers Hrvatski narod, Novi list from 
Sarajevo and Hrvatski list would devote a large 
number of articles to disputes in the Allied ranks. 
Hrvatski narod used to publish articles that dis-
cussed this topic either on the front or the last 
page (pages six or four). In exactly one hundred 
issues – from issue number 1225 of 3 January 
1945, to issue number 1325 of 5 May 1945 – there 
were 44 such articles published. This means that 
the editorial staff devoted a significant amount of 
space to the Allies and their conflicts nearly every 
other day. Hrvatski list from Osijek, which was in 
print until mid-April 1945, published 24 articles 
on the same topic from 3 January to 7 April (is-
sues 1 through 73), mostly on pages 1 or 2. Novi 
list from Sarajevo published 17 articles, usually on 
pages 2 or 3, from 6 January to 28 March, or issues 
1119 through 1188. These articles predicted the 
imminent collapse of the Alliance, World War III, 
and an apocalyptic global future. There was an 
attempt to create a public impression that the 
Alliance was collapsing and that all human and 
material resources should be drafted in the strife 
against communists. In Ustasha ranks there was a 
belief that such a development in the ISC would 
secure, in the foreign policy sense, a possibility of 
negotiations with the Western Allies, which was 
an important argument in favor of the post-war 
future of the ISC. This was, quite naturally, an 
impossible mission, since Germany and its satel-
lites had lost the war. Another utopia in the ISC 
was an imaginary separate peace, for the Allies 
had already agreed in Moscow, prior to the Teh-
ran conference, that the Ustasha would be perse-
cuted in the courts of the restored DFJ. 
There was also a significant amount of 
propaganda material in the pages of Ustasha 
newspapers in favor of the Third Reich, which 
was dedicated to the poor economic status of the 
countries that had been claimed by the Allies. 
According to the ISC press, famine, poverty and 
utter anarchy described Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy 
and France well. Through articles that irrationally 
extolled the power of German resistance behind 
the ranks of Allied armies in France, the readers 
were continually assured that Germany had hid-
den reserves and potentials to turn the tide of war 
to its own favor. Special significance was given to 
the new V-weapons and long-range missiles. The 
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obviously absurd thing about the German, and 
consequentially the Ustasha propaganda were 
texts that in all earnest covered the National So-
cialist movement in western and eastern parts of 
the Reich, which allegedly fought for freedom and 
honor behind the enemy’s back. 
In the spring of 1945 there was an obvious 
shift toward a more neutral view of the Allied war 
operations in the Ustasha newspapers, because in 
the disintegration phase of the Neue Europa 
dream, the final goal of the Ustasha propaganda 
was to draw the ISC closer to the Western Allies, 
securing surrender at the “green-topped table”. In 
accordance with the said aim, Ustasha authorities 
tried to create an impression that the Ustasha 
organization was a national movement for the 
liberation of the Croatian people. It was, therefore, 
to be released from the shared guilt for the New 
Europe project, and the implementation of poli-
cies that awaited the Nazi and fascist regimes. 
This was partially reflected in the printed word, 
and was especially prominent in articles by Mili-
voj Magdić, Ivo Bogdan and Vilko Rieger in the 
pages of Hrvatski narod, Spremnost and Nova 
Hrvatska, when the ISC was suddenly ranked 
among the Western democracies on 6 May 1945. 
The Ustasha propaganda considered the 
communist government established in the fall of 
1945 in Belgrade an inappropriate pact between 
the Allies, the royal government in London and 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunis-
tička partija Jugoslavije – KPJ) against the ISC. 
Accordingly, the international recognition of the 
Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia in Yalta was 
proclaimed the victory of Soviet politics in South-
eastern Europe. Tito and King Peter II were de-
scribed as promoters of Soviet and British policies, 
mere pawns in the hands of the Allies who fought 
for the restoration of Yugoslavia at Croatia’s ex-
pense. Apart from the usual slogans about the 
necessity of a persistent struggle for the preserva-
tion of the Croatian state, which was unfounded, 
neither the ISC press nor the Ustasha authorities 
offered an alternative, for there could be none. 
The Ustasha press persisted on the promotion of 
the incorrect fact that the Croatian people had no 
alternative to Ustasha politics, and that any poli-
cies which opposed them would mean the return 
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in nature, the evidence of which is found in the 
aforementioned editorials by Milan Ilinić and 
Marko Čović in Hrvatski narod. In the final months 
of the war, Hrvatski narod, as the most widely cir-
culated daily in the ISC, and Spremnost, as the 
most important weekly newspaper, had the task 
of building up a fighting spirit of a kind, as well 
as creating the atmosphere of fear from com-
munist retribution, to which testify articles by 
Milan Ilinić, Ivan Oršanić and Marko Čović, but 
also those of Milivoj Magdić, Petar Bareza, Tijas 
Mortigi, Vilko Rieger and others. /75/ 
The first goal of Ustasha leadership was 
not reached, since global war circumstances dic-
tated the fate of Ustasha regime and the ISC, 
while the anti-communist propaganda was partly 
successful, the testimony to which are some 115-
120 thousand members of the Croatian armed 
forces and civilians who fled to the West in early 
May 1945. /76/ 
Spremnost had another task, namely to se-
cure the surrender of Ustasha leadership in the 
West. There is no other viable explanation for its 
moderately Anglophile character in times when 
newspaper editorial staff was “Ustasha-ized”, 
which meant that journalists who declined to join 
the Ustasha ranks were fired, persecuted and 
incarcerated. 
To fulfill its mission as the war drew to its 
end, Ustasha propaganda had to simulate the 
change in values which supported Ustasha ideol-
ogy. On the pages of Spremnost, plutocrats were no 
longer the bitterest of enemies, since by the end of 
the war the ISC government secretly tried to find 
common ground with the Western Allies, at least 
as far as it concerned the terms of surrender, 
which necessarily affected the choice of language 
in the newspapers. The Ustasha regime consid-
ered Soviets a more dangerous enemy than West-
ern democracies, and therefore opted for the less-
er of the “two evils”. When this is viewed in the 
light of the Memorandum sent on 4 May 1945 to 
General Harold Alexander, the commanding of-
ficer of the Allied forces on the Mediterranean, the 
intention of the Ustasha leadership was clear. /77/ 
 
Conclusion 
In late 1944 and early 1945, the ISC newspapers 
tried to prove the existence of discord between the 
Allies, and the absurdity of shared war goals be-
tween the USA, the United Kingdom and the 
USSR. It was an important task for the Ustasha 
regime. In February, March and April of 1945, 
daily newspapers Hrvatski narod, Novi list from 
Sarajevo and Hrvatski list would devote a large 
number of articles to disputes in the Allied ranks. 
Hrvatski narod used to publish articles that dis-
cussed this topic either on the front or the last 
page (pages six or four). In exactly one hundred 
issues – from issue number 1225 of 3 January 
1945, to issue number 1325 of 5 May 1945 – there 
were 44 such articles published. This means that 
the editorial staff devoted a significant amount of 
space to the Allies and their conflicts nearly every 
other day. Hrvatski list from Osijek, which was in 
print until mid-April 1945, published 24 articles 
on the same topic from 3 January to 7 April (is-
sues 1 through 73), mostly on pages 1 or 2. Novi 
list from Sarajevo published 17 articles, usually on 
pages 2 or 3, from 6 January to 28 March, or issues 
1119 through 1188. These articles predicted the 
imminent collapse of the Alliance, World War III, 
and an apocalyptic global future. There was an 
attempt to create a public impression that the 
Alliance was collapsing and that all human and 
material resources should be drafted in the strife 
against communists. In Ustasha ranks there was a 
belief that such a development in the ISC would 
secure, in the foreign policy sense, a possibility of 
negotiations with the Western Allies, which was 
an important argument in favor of the post-war 
future of the ISC. This was, quite naturally, an 
impossible mission, since Germany and its satel-
lites had lost the war. Another utopia in the ISC 
was an imaginary separate peace, for the Allies 
had already agreed in Moscow, prior to the Teh-
ran conference, that the Ustasha would be perse-
cuted in the courts of the restored DFJ. 
There was also a significant amount of 
propaganda material in the pages of Ustasha 
newspapers in favor of the Third Reich, which 
was dedicated to the poor economic status of the 
countries that had been claimed by the Allies. 
According to the ISC press, famine, poverty and 
utter anarchy described Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy 
and France well. Through articles that irrationally 
extolled the power of German resistance behind 
the ranks of Allied armies in France, the readers 
were continually assured that Germany had hid-
den reserves and potentials to turn the tide of war 
to its own favor. Special significance was given to 
the new V-weapons and long-range missiles. The 
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